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art I of this two-part article ad-
dressed the constitutional right to
 speedy trial and provided a pre
liminary discussion of the statutory right
to a speedy trial.' Part II discusses vari-
ous issues that arise under Colorado's
speedy trial statute, including: (1) delays
caused by appellate proceedings; (2) in-
teractions between the right to a speedy
trial and the right to the effective assis-
tance of counsel; and (3) delays that are




If a defendant's conviction at trial is re-
versed on appeal, any new trial must
commence within six months of the date
the trial court receives the mandate from
the appellate court.2 This rule does not
apply to a conviction resulting from a plea
of guilty.
3
If an interlocutory appeal is taken in
a case, the period of delay caused by the
appeal is not included in calculating the
statutory speedy trial period, regardless
of whether the interlocutory appeal is
commenced by the defendant or the pros-
ecution,4 and regardless of whether the
appeal is procedurally flawed or denied
by the appellate court.5 The delay caused
by the appeal and a reasonable amount
of time for resetting the matter for trial
following remand to the trial court are
excluded from the speedy trial calcula-
tion.6 Similarly, any delay caused by an
original proceeding pursuant to C.A.R.
21 tolls the speedy trial statute.
7
The breadth of this exclusion of time
spent on interlocutory appeals is not
without limit. An interlocutory appeal
must: (1) have been taken in good faith;
(2) have arguable merit; (3) not have been
taken for the purposes of delay; and (4)
have raised issues that substantially im-
pacted the prosecution's case.8
In People v. Witty,9 the defendant suc-
cessfully moved to recuse the District At-
torney's Office on the ground that the
charges against him involved an allega-
tion that he defrauded a pension fund
that covered employees in the prosecu-
tor's office. The prosecution took an ap-
peal to the Colorado Court of Appeals,
which was denied on the ground that no
final judgment had entered in the case.
The defendant subsequently entered a
guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal
the speedy trial issue because far more
than six months had passed since he en-
tered his plea of not guilty.
The Court of Appeals addressed the
speedy trial issue this time, and held that
the speedy trial statute had been violat-
ed, finding that the appeals were not in-
terlocutory for purposes of the statute.
An order disqualifying a prosecutor may
cause a minor delay while a new prose-
cutor is appointed; such an order "has no
substantial effect on the prosecution's
case for purposes of determining wheth-
er appeal of that order is an interlocuto-
ry appeal."10 The court went on to add
that "a defendant.., should not have his
or her period of incarceration extended
while the government sorts out who
should prosecute."" The defendant's
guilty plea was vacated and the Witty
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case was remanded to the trial court with
directions to dismiss the charge.
For appeal time to be excluded from the
speedy trial calculation, the appeal must
be taken in the pending case. In People v.
Rosidivito,'12 the prosecution, in a separate
action, obtained a trial court order unseal-
ing the defendant's record. The defendant
appealed pursuant to CAR. 21. The Colo-
rado Court of Appeals held that the delay
caused by the defendant's C.A.R. 21 ap-
peal should not be added to the period in
which he must be brought to trial. The
court concluded that the defendant's right
to appeal in the separate case cannot be
conditioned on his waiver of speedy trial
in the pending criminal case.
1 3
Speedy Trial and the Right
To Effective Assistance of
Counsel
Another issue that recurs with some fre-
quency is the tension that arises between
the right to a speedy trial and the right to
the effective assistance of counsel. The
right to counsel is as important and fun-
damental as the right to a speedy and pub-
lic trial. For a variety of reasons, counsel
may not be prepared to proceed to trial, or
may not be able to continue to represent
the defendant. If these problems necessi-
tate a continuance or the hiring or appoint-
ment of new counsel, speedy trial prob-
lems may arise, particularly when the ef-
fective assistance issue arises at, or near,
the time of trial.
In general, unless a criminal defendant
is brought to trial within six months of the
date he or she enters a plea of not guilty,
charges against the defendant must be
dismissed.14 If the defendant validly waives
the right to a speedy trial to resolve the
effective assistance issue, the statutory
speedy trial issue is resolved by that waiv-
er. However, if the defendant refuses to
waive the right to speedy trial, the issue
becomes more complicated.
If the defendant requests a continuance,
the basic rule that six months is added to
the statutory speedy trial period may be
applicable. If the need for a substitution of
counsel is properly chargeable to the
defendant, and counsel must have a con-
tinuance to effectively represent the de-
fendant, the speedy trial period may be
extended by the operation of CRS § 18-1-
405(3). A continuance is "chargeable to
defendant if it was caused by an affirma-
tive act of his, with his express consent, or
by other affirmative conduct evincing con-
sent."15
The determination of whether the con-
tinuance necessitated by the substitution
of counsel is properly chargeable to the de-
fendant must be made on a case-by-case
basis. 16 If the delay is created by a substi-
tution of defense counsel caused by the de-
fendant's unwillingness to cooperate with
his or her original counsel, the resulting
delay may be attributable to the defen-
dant. This rule applies even if the defen-
dant objects to the substitution of counsel
and to the continuance needed to enable
new counsel to prepare for trial.
17
A continuance due to defense counsel's
unavailability to try a case within the stat-
utory speedy trial period may be charge-
able to the defendant, thus extending the
statutory speedy trial deadline.' 8 Even in
the absence of a showing that defense
counsel was unavailable, delays in sched-
uling a trial to accommodate defense coun-
sel have been attributable to the defendant
in determining whether the speedy trial
statute has been violated. 9
The constitutional right to counsel im-
pacts these situations regardless of the
applicability of the statute. The Colorado
Court of Appeals has held that the protec-
tion of certain constitutional rights justi-
fies a delay in trying a criminal case. That
court has approved an extension of the six-
month speedy trial time period to protect
the constitutional right to counsel when
defense counsel was unprepared to pro-
ceed on the trial date through no fault of
the defendant.
20
If defense counsel has caused a delay in
the proceedings by failing to file motions
in a timely fashion, that period of delay
may well be attributable to the defendant
and toll the speedy trial statute. The Col-
orado Supreme Court applied this princi-
ple when defense counsel made an oral
motion to dismiss on joinder grounds on
the morning of trial, and the court and
prosecution needed time to research and
resolve the issue.2' However, it is not ap-
propriate to toll the statute and continue
the case when defense counsel does not
file a notice of defense or list of witnesses
when the defense is general denial and
the defendant does not intend to call any
witnesses.22
In all of these situations, if the delay is
not the fault of the defendant, the trial
court should make every effort to accom-
modate both the speedy trial and effective
assistance rights of a defendant. In People
ex rel. Gallagher v. District Court,23 the Col-
orado Supreme Court held that the delay
arising from the replacement of counsel-
whose schedule did not allow him to try
the case before a speedy trial deadline-
was not properly chargeable to the defen-
dant. The Court ordered the trial court to
bring the defendant to trial within the two
months remaining before the expiration
of the statutory speedy trial deadline. The
Court made it clear that the trial court had
not made the appropriate effort to find
counsel who could try the case within the
speedy trial framework.
Both the determination of whether to
allow counsel to withdraw and the grant-
ing of a continuance are left to the sound
discretion of the trial court. These issues




Continuances at the request of the pros-
ecution, without the consent of the defen-
dant, generally do not extend the period of
speedy trial. However, there is one instance
in which the statutory right to a speedy
trial can be extended by the prosecutions
motion to continue, even over a defendant's
objection. CRS § 18-1-405(6)(g)(I) allows
up to six additional months to be added to
the speedy trial time if the prosecution es-
tablishes the following three factors: (1)
evidence that is material to the state's case
is unavailable; (2) the prosecution has ex-
ercised due diligence to obtain such evi-
dence; and (3) reasonable grounds exist to
believe that the evidence will be available
at a later date.
Extensions of the speedy trial time un-
der CRS § 18-1-405(6)(g)(I) have been ap-
proved when the prosecution: (1) needed
time to complete the trial of a co-defendant
and make the co-defendant available to
testify;25 (2) demonstrated both due dili-
gence in obtaining the victim's presence at
trial and the availability of the victim at a
later date;26 (3) demonstrated due diligence
by issuing regular subpoenas and making
lodging arrangements for out-of-state wit-
nesses, in the good faith belief that the wit-
nesses would continue to cooperate;27 or
(4) thought, in good faith, that an essen-
tial witness would have given birth and
would be available by the trial date.'
On the other hand, the Supreme Court
has held that a mere unsupported allega-
tion that a material witness will be una-
vailable on the trial date is insufficient to
satisfy the three prongs of CRS § 18-1-405
(6g)I)029 In Sweet v. Myers, the Court held
that a mere claim that a witness would be
unavailable did not amount to a showing
60 / The Colorado Lawyer / August 2002 / Vol. 31, No. 8
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of due diligence by the prosecution to ob-
tain the presence of the witness on the
scheduled trial date, particularly because
there was no evidence that the witness
would be available at a later trial date.
30
Actions of the prosecution, other than
formal requests for a continuance, also
may cause delays that are attributable to
the prosecution. For example, when the
prosecution fails to comply with discovery
requirements in a timely fashion, the de-
lay resulting from the defendant's request
for a continuance to evaluate the new in-
formation has been charged to the prose-
cution, not to the defendant.31 Even in this
situation, appellate courts consider other
factors, such as the defendant's objection
to any speedy trial waiver and the avail-
ability of new trial dates within the speedy
trial period.
3 2
The prosecution cannot indiscriminate-
ly dismiss and re-file charges to avoid the
mandate of the speedy trial statute." How-
ever, if the prosecution re-files as a result
of a change in circumstances that justifies
the re-filing, the speedy trial calculation
may start anew.34 Dismissal and re-filing
to comply with compulsoryjoinder require-
ments has been deemed a legitimate ex-
cuse.35 The motive of the prosecution-
good or bad faith-is a relevant consider-
ation in these circumstances.'6
Miscellaneous Delays
And Other Issues
CRS § 18-1-405 provides for the exclu-
sion of certain other periods of time from
the calculation of the speedy trial time pe-
riod. In the event of a mistrial, the statu-
tory speedy trial period is extended for a
reasonable period of delay, not to exceed
three months, caused by each mistrial.
37
A delay of two months in scheduling the
retrial has been deemed reasonable when
the new trial date was the first available
date on the court's docket.38 A retrial-af-
ter a mistrial-that occurs more than three
months after the mistrial, but still within
the original six-month speedy trial period,
has been held to comply with the speedy
trial statute.
39
CRS § 18-1-405(6)(i) provides that the
time between the filing of a motion for
change of venue and the ruling on that
motion shall be excluded from the speedy
trial time calculation. This subsection over-
ruled pre-existing case law.4° If the motion
for change of venue is granted, the time
between the granting of the motion and
the first appearance in the appropriate
court also is excluded. Additionally, if the
change of venue occurs after a trial date
has already been set in the original ven-
ue, the court in the new venue has an ad-
ditional three months from the first ap-
pearance of all parties within which to con-
duct the trial.
4 1
By statute, the following are to be ex-
cluded from the calculation of the speedy
trial period: (1) the period during which a
defendant is incompetent to stand trial;
(2) the period during which a defendant is
being evaluated on the question of compe-
tency or sanity; and (3) the period during
which a defendant "is unable to appear by
reason of illness or physical disability
"42
The speedy trial time period is not to in-
clude any reasonable period of delay due
to the joinder for trial of a co-defendant.43
There are two limitations on this exten-
sion of the speedy trial time. First, the co-
defendant's time for trial must not have
run; and second, there must be good cause
to deny a request for a severance of the de-
fendants.44
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The delay caused by the recusal of the
original trial judge ordinarily does not jus-
tify extending the statutory speedy trial
time period. In People v. Arledge,45 the de-
fendant's original motion to recuse the tri-
al court was denied. Just before trial, the
defendant supplemented the record and
the trial court recused itself The trial court
then obtained a speedy trial waiver over
the objection of defense counsel. The case
was re-assigned and set for a date outside
the original speedy trial time period, again
over the objection of the defendant. The
Colorado Supreme Court held that: (1) no
part of the delay was attributable to the
defendant; (2) the original trial court was
without authority to obtain a waiver once
it had recused itself; and (3) the prosecu-
tion or court had a duty to find a trialjudge
who could hear the matter in a timely
fashion, including seeking the appoint-
ment of a senior judge.
The Colorado Supreme Court has indi-
cated its disapproval of certain other pro-
cedures employed by trial courts that have
the effect of extending the statutory speedy
trial time limit. In People v. Chavez,4 the
Court expressly disapproved the practice
of the trial judge in postponing arraign-
ment until all pretrial matters had been
concluded. Similarly, in Barela v. People,
47
the Court disapproved the trial court's
practice of empaneling a jury, then con-
ducting motions hearings, then swearing
in the jury. In Barela, the prosecution took
an interlocutory appeal alter the last-min-
ute motions hearing. The Court held that
this procedure undermined the general
scheme established by the Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure ("C.R.Crim.P.") for resolv-
ing motions.48 In neither Chavez nor Ba-
rela did the Court expressly hold that the
trial court's procedures either did, or did
not, justify an extension of the statutory
speedy trial time period. However, the dis-
approval of these procedures suggests that
the Court is not likely to view them as vi-
able justifications for an extension of the
statutory speedy trial period.
One source of occasional confusion is
the effect bail has on the calculation of the
statutory speedy trial time period. Simply
granting bail to a defendant does not af-
fect the statutory right to a speedy trial,
even when the defendant posts a bond and
is released.49 If a defendant's bond is re-
voked and increased due to the commis-
sion of a felony offense while out on bond,
the defendant must be brought to trial
within ninety days of the increase, or with-
in six months of arraignment, whichever
is earliest.50 If a defendant's bond is re-
voked and increased due to the prosecu-
tion's request that is based on factors oth-
er than the commission of a new offense,
the speedy trial time limits are not affect-
ed.51
Conclusion
The court and prosecution in criminal
cases have a continuing duty to ensure
that an accused is brought to trial in a
speedy fashion. The constitutional right to
a speedy trial remains a cornerstone of
the U.S. justice system, and ofjustice it-
self The statutory right to a speedy trial
is designed to implement this constitu-
tional guarantee. In recent years, a num-
ber of amendments have made it more
difficult for criminal defendants to suc-
cessfully assert a speedy trial violation.
Nonetheless, it is incumbent on the court
and counsel for both the prosecution and
defense to remain aware of and vigorously
protect the right to a speedy trial.
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